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DOTTRINA

La portata selettiva di tale modifica consente di ritenere che il Legislatore del 2020
abbia voluto ridurre l’area applicativa dell’incriminazione, escludendo che la violazione di
meri principi generali possa integrare il nuovo abuso d’ufficio. La selettività del DL
Semplificazioni richiede altresì, per configurare l’elemento oggettivo del fatto tipico del
nuovo abuso d’ufficio, che il pubblico agente violi regole di condotta «dalle quali non resi-
duino margini di discrezionalità».
Così facendo, il Legislatore attribuisce rilevanza alle sole regole che non implicano
l’esercizio di un potere discrezionale da parte della pubblica amministrazione: la ratio della
riforma è proprio la inibizione della magistratura penale sulla discrezionalità amministra-
tiva. La riforma cerca così di porre un freno al conclamato timore dei rappresentanti della
pubblica amministrazione di assumere decisioni discrezionali.

The purpose of this contribution is to review the essential aspects of the new abuse of office - as
amended by the “Semplificazione” Decree, July 16, 2020 - capturing as much light and shadow as pos-
sible, starting from a rapid reconstruction of the history of the crime from the Rocco Code to the 1990
amendment, then from the 1997 reform to the Severino Law of 2012. Among the reasons for the reform,
the circumstance for which the procedures for abuse of office most often originate from the failure of the
so-called administrative law of efficiency takes on importance. Since July 16, 2020, with the introduction
of the “Semplificazione” Decree, it is no longer sufficient to violate any rule of law or regulation to be
incriminated for abuse of office, but it is necessary the “violation of laws” or “acts having the force of
law”; therefore, the violation of regulations no longer assumes criminal relevance, a circumstance that remo-
ves many conducts from punishability. The novel leaves the other elements of the case unchanged, continuing
to require the dual event of the unjust financial advantage or unjust damage, the object of the intentional
willful misconduct of the public official or public service appointee, which puts into effect the activity in the
performance of the functions or service, still providing - as a further mode of conduct - the failure to comply
with the obligation to abstain in the presence of a self-interest or a close relative or in the other cases pre-
scribed. Anything that previously fell within the violation of the law and regulations, unless it can be con-
sidered a “specific rule of conduct expressly provided for by law” or “by an act having the force of law”,
and provided that it “leaves no margin of discretion”, cannot therefore, strictly speaking, continue to have
criminal relevance. The selective scope of this amendment makes it possible to consider that the Legislator
of 2020 wanted to reduce the area of application of the incrimination, excluding that the violation of
mere general principles could integrate the new abuse of office. The selectivity of the “Semplificazione”
Decree also requires, in order to configure the objective element of the typical fact of the new abuse of
office, that the public agent violates rules of conduct “from which there is no margin of discretion”.
In doing so, the Legislator attributes relevance only to rules that do not imply the exercise of discre-
tionary power by the public administration: the rationale of the reform is precisely the inhibition of the
criminal judiciary on administrative discretion. The reform thus seeks to put a brake on the public admi-
nistration’s well-established fear of making discretionary decisions.

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