Page 107 - La Grande Guerra dei Carabinieri

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Parigi, 1916. Per la prima volta all’estero, la Banda dell’Arma, sotto la direzione del Maestro Cajoli, suona a Les Invalides.
Paris, 1916. For the first time abroad, the Carabinieri band, conducted by Maestro Cajoli, plays at Les Invalides.

Italy’s international commitment
international commitment

in the First War World

n May 22, 1882, Italy became part of the Triple Alli-
ance, with Germany and Austria-Hungary, in order
O to guarantee its own international security. Despite
the signing of the treaty, a point of conciliation of the di-
vergent interpretations had not yet been found at the time
of the crisis that led to the outbreak of the First World
War. A few days after the ultimatum of Austria-Hunga-
ry to Serbia and the consequent declarations of war by
Berlin and Vienna on France, Russia and Great Britain, on 3 August 1914, the Italian government declared its
neutrality, by not bringing into effect the “casus foederis” envisaged by the Triple Alliance: a purely defensive
agreement. Italy officially entered the war against Austria-Hungary on 24 May 1915 and Italian politics moved
in line with military operations. However, the international politics of the allied countries did not always respect
the Italian position and the government had to often ask its allies, especially the European ones, to maintain the
agreements made. Within the Italian Government, two opposing attitudes emerged: on the one hand, for exam-
ple, Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino considered the objectives set out in the agreement, signed in April 1915,
to be irrevocable, while on the other hand, the Minister for Military Assistance and War Pensions, Leonidas
Bissolati, pushed for a compromise with representatives of the Slavic nations, in accordance with the principle
of nationality and in the hope of being able to construct a climate of dialogue and collaboration between the new
states that arose from the ashes of the Habsburg Empire. Between the two opposing sides, the then Prime Min-
ister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, (head of government in the days of Caporetto) at the beginning, seemed to be
more inclined to listen to Bissolati’s reasoning. Nearing the end of the armed conflict, however, with Italian suc-
cesses, Orlando moved toward Sonnino’s more rigid position, and without ever reaching a definitive clarifica-
tion, led Italy to face the successive and very delicate peace negotiations without a strategy shared by the mem-
bers of the Italian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.