Page 148 - Rassegna 2022-4

OSSERVATORIO INTERNAZIONALE

In an unstable country like Afghanistan, where terrorism, insurgency and
organised crime were mingling and in unison subverting the foundations of the
institutions, wouldn’t it have been better to deploy a military force expressing
also civil law enforcement capabilities? They could have complemented and/or
replaced the local Police, monitoring and intervening on corrupt and afflictive
behaviours, providing services to the populace, thus filling the “security gap”,
rather than leaving these tasks to the Afghan National Police (ANP), whose
inefficiency was well known.
There was in fact the need for an asset which was interoperable with both
the Military and the civil society, capable to calibrate different levels of force
and seeking to reduce the risk of “collateral damage” to the local population
as much as possible. That would have hampered the Taliban’s narrative at its
core. I am talking about an asset like the Multinational Specialized Unit,
NATO Stability Policing’s forefather; a model now adopted by the major inter-
national organizations, albeit with different names and perspectives, but with
similar functions, whose distinctive feature is the ability to carry out commu-
nity-oriented policing to protect the civilian population. Failing to immediately
ensure the rule of law and guarantee public order and security, hence to seize
the so-called critical golden hour, has meant failing to provide a timely and
effective response to the needs of the population and to help legitimise local
governments.
Indeed, the ANP operated in a chaotic context, characterised by three
judicial systems (based on Islamic law, jirga/shura tribal system and penal pro-
cedural law, poisoned by an infamous bribe and release culture). Never were the
ANP dedicated to the protection of civilians, despite the German and Turkish
reforms in the early 1900s, as well as during Soviet domination.
Nevertheless, the efforts of the international community have focused on
developing a “paramilitary” force to support counter-insurgency operations
conducted by the Afghan Army, rather than ensuring public order and security.
Furthermore, the ANP, the most corrupt institution in the country, was charac-
terized by endemic problems of discipline, transparency, nepotism, widespread
drug use and inconsistent command and control relationships, as well as fre-
quent resort to torture and the signing of written confessions to obtain convic-
tions in court (the deep gender inequalities that characterised the ANP would
deserve a separate chapter).
Strategically, the ANP were tasked to man checkpoints located at the main
crossing points of Afghanistan (what an opportunity to undisturbed prey upon
travellers), neglecting the suburbs and remote villages, ultimately abandoned to
themselves.

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