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Stability Policing

The great absence in the Afghan conundrum

Afghanistan, August 2021: is the collapse of the security forces Afghans’
sole responsibility, due to their ancestral tribal divisions and deep-rooted insti-
tutional corruption, or is it also the International Community’s responsibility?
However, this article is not meant to blame anyone. We are here to learn from
the past and suggest possible solutions applicable in future, similar scenarios, to
contribute to fostering long-term peace, stability, and development. Were only tri-
bal divisions and deep-rooted institutional corruption responsible for the Afghan
Security Forces’ (ASF) collapse or are there others to be singled out as well?
Is it not true that, since 2001, little or no consideration was given to
Robust Police assets’ role? In a such unstable environment where the Police was
“the most hated institution”, how was it possible to delegate police tasks to
ruthless tribal militias, armed and subsidized by the intervening Countries,
rather than applying the Stability Policing model which, since 1998, the
International Community has adopted to respond to the security needs of the
population so effectively in the Balkans, in Iraq and in East Timor? After all,
wars are like natural disasters: they wipe away everything, leaving behind
nothing but blood, instability, and chaos. And who governs this chaos? Whilst
the Military deals with the enemy, it is crucial to counter those who benefit
from havoc, the adversaries of the Coalition, those who take advantage of the
war-crime overlap in the so-called grey zone, spoiling the peace process.
Wouldn't it have been better to call for a mandate from the UN Security
Council to deploy Stability Policing units to deal with this state of almost total anar-
chy, thus filling this security vacuum? Instead, Resolution 1386/2001 to support
international efforts to eradicate terrorism was based on two different criteria (the
so-called light footprint approach and the lead-nations system), and - if I may - on
a miscalculation, i.e., considering the fight against terrorism as an almost exclusively
counterinsurgency military problem rather than as a social and police-related one.
As a form of organized crime that terrifies the population and destabilizes
the Rule of Law, terrorism should better be addressed through both deradica-
lization and reintegration into the society as well as by targeted investigations
aimed at dismantling its structure, network, as well as sources of supply and
financing (the so-called “Falcone Method”: i.e., “follow the money”). Indeed,
terrorism becomes a military problem only as a last resort when its threat is so
imminent that it can only be neutralized by kinetic actions.

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