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HUMAN, TACTICAL OR TECHNICAL: THE
    HUMAN      , T A CTICAL OR TECHNICAL          : THE
         NATURE OF MODERN PEACEKEEPERS
         NATURE OF MODERN PEACEKEEPERS
            bility of an SP asset across the full  berspace and in the information   other military forces. Under a com-
            spectrum of crises – before, during  environment. Urban and  littoral   prehensive approach, non-military
            and after confl icts - should encou-  settings are where most people     actors may also collaborate in sta-
            rage an Ally under threat. Is the  live and where they will increasin-  bility policing activities such as:
            strength of NATO not to be sought  gly  live.  Since  confl icts  break  out   police forces with civilian  status,
            in this mutual support,  especially  amongst  people, and  police are   IOs, NGOs, and contractors . This
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            if, when and where one Ally can-    often the fi rst responders to these   inclusiveness  fosters interoperabi-
            not face challenges  on its own?    crises,  acquiring and using their   lity, aims at enabling the Alliance
            The evolving  doctrinal framework  experience  and expertise  is and    to  select the most  suitable  asset
            and particularly the current review  will be more and more signifi cant.   and avoids missing opportunities.
            of the 3.2 Series  contemplates that  This implies that  urban  challen-  The “missing” capability – Why
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            offensive,  defensive  and stability  ges may  progressively  blur  poli-  does NATO need an SP Con-
            operations all encompass stability,  ce and military functions as these   cept?
            enabling, defensive  and  offensive  areas of responsibility overlap. In   NATO lacks a capability that pre-
            activities,  which  could arguably  turn,  conducting military opera-   cisely  defi nes  the  sets  of  require-
            be extended to SP, although by li-  tions among dense civilian popu-    ments for SP across the Doctrine,
            miting them to the policing remit.  lations will require military per-  Organization, Materiel, Personnel,
            Indeed, history shows that SP can  sonnel to have policing-like skills .  Leadership, Facilities and Interope-
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            and  should  be conducted  throu-   In general, a successful interaction   rability (DOTMPLFI)  framework.
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            ghout the full spectrum of confl ict  between conventional military and   This entails that during a force ge-
            and crisis in all operations themes  policing  components  will  require   neration process Nations can pro-
            (from peacetime military enga-      an appropriate level  of interope-  vide the Alliance with SP contribu-
            gement  to  warfi ghting),  before,  rability to ensure that they can be   tions that lack police expertise and
            during  and  after  (armed)  confl i-  ready,  available and  jointly de-  that SP is not properly acknowled-
            cts and  manmade and  natural  ployable  to  both permissive  and       ged as capability within the NATO
            disasters,  because  the (fragile)  non-permissive      environments.   Defence Planning Process (NDPP) .
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            HN and its populace may requi-      An essential principle about SP sta-  History shows that SP should be in-
            re help whenever  and wherever  tes, “all  can contribute to SP, but    cluded in the planning process from
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            there are policing gaps. SP contri-  not  everyone can do  everything”.   the very beginning and that lack of
            butes to win the war, by creating  Policing  is indeed very different   expert  and  experienced policing
            effects on adversaries  and  ene-   from soldiering and reinforcing     personnel in reinforcement or tem-
            mies, but also to build the peace,  IPF or temporarily replacing them,   porary replacement of the IPF can
            an aspect of fundamental impor-     especially in a fragile state, while   have disastrous consequences .
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            tance and relevance  especially  in  conducting a military campaign,    Considering dedicated Stability Po-
            a connected, globalized world.      is even more demanding. Basic SP    licing Unit (SPU) requirements du-
            Projecting  stability  is  key to pre-  activities  and tasks (for instance,   ring the next NDPP cycle and targe-
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            vent and deter crises,  including  presence patrols, critical site secu-  ting them to Nations would ensure
            armed  confl ict  and  cannot  pre-  rity, election security) can be con-  these capabilities will be available
            scind from addressing policing  ducted  by  any trained,  equipped      and readily usable during any for-
            requirements. To  this aim,  SP  is  and  tasked unit  or  asset. Higher   ce generation process. In NATO a
            credible, instrumental and com-     level SP such as investigating orga-  concept is an instrument to cohe-
            plementary to  other  actor’s ef-   nised crimes, disrupting internatio-  rently  fi ll  a  capability  gap,  but
            forts; this  reasoning has been  nal terrorist networks or mentoring    one has yet to be adopted on SP.
            demonstrated  oftentimes also in  HN senior leaders require a con-      There  are  some  inherent  diffi cul-
            NATO operations  and  missions .  siderable  level  of  specifi c  experti-  ties  on the path towards an ap-
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            Although “land heavy”, SP is not  se, experience and set of skills. In   proved SP concept, not lastly be-
            limited  to  a  specifi c  domain,  in  reality, a vast array of forces can   cause of the differences  between
            the same way criminals, terrorists  and should contribute to SP, in-    NATO Nation’s police forces (mi-
            and insurgents are active on land  cluding Gendarmerie-type forces,     litary/civilian  status, military po-
            and sea as well as in the air, in cy-  which are the fi rst choice , MP and   lice,  powers, jurisdictions, legal
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