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THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION

If we project conclusions from the present for the future, we can expect
Western Europe with the United States and Russia with China. Currently, it is
a question how to secure the loyalty of Western Europe to the United States
even though this may cause economic damage to the former, and how Western
Europe should avoid being forced to break up with China. This is why some
Western actors try to balance and maneuver between the two poles so as not to
become more peripheral to the outer circle of Western Europe than before but
also to join China’s periphery directly. Meanwhile, some of them maximize the
benefits of belonging to Western institutions both guaranteeing their security
and the economic benefits of the European Union. And here the question ari-
ses as to how these states can participate values based integrations while
‘paying’ with political loyalty for the economic benefits they may have with
China (and in some cases Russia) for their cooperation. It is questionable how
long this peacock dance can continue and when such states find themselves in
an impossible situation (if at all) due to their swing policies. The fact that a
Member State cannot be excluded from either the EU or NATO reinforces the
temptation for this pragmatic, if not outright cynical policy. However, it would
be dangerous to pursue such a course by states, which are yet to join one or
both of the two organizations, because unexpected barriers to entry may rise
(higher).
Although China defines itself as an international political actor that does
not expect its partners to share the Chinese model, but its expectations are clear
in terms of the red lines its partners are not supposed to cross. China has taken
advantage of that the West is not united in its reaction to the emerging situa-
tion. However, China does not use the same tools to “promote” division as
Russia with far more modest economic power. Suffice it to refer here to the
17+1 cooperation . A similarly beneficial cooperation framework is not offe-
(22)
red by Russia. It offers the Eurasian Economic Union to its post-Soviet par-
tners but there is hesitation to join due to certain disadvantages.
It would also be in the interest of the United States that Russia does not
fall China’s lap. Even though Moscow may have the same interest, by no means
the result is certain. Namely not because Russia as an independent civilization
- more precisely as its center - assumes a multipolar international system where
it defines its role as one of the poles of the system.

(22) 17+1 became 16+1 (again) in Spring 2021 with the voluntary departure of Lithuania from the
group. See Kinling Lo, Lithuania quit 17+1 because access to Chinese market did not improve,
its envoy says. South China Morning Post, June 1, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplo-
macy/article/3135522/lithuania-quit-171-because-access-chinese-market-did-not Accessed July
26, 2021.

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