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OSSERVATORIO INTERNAZIONALE

Regionally, as China is pursuing hegemony in the Far East in an undisgui-
sed manner, while the United States guarantees the security of Japan and South
Korea and wants to retain Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. It follows from China’s
regional behavior that it would act in a similar way globally if it had the strength
to do so. However, it would not be easy to prove this by way of extrapolation
as it does not necessarily yield a sufficiently convincing result. The gaining of
economic influence, seeking to gain in market share is not to be welcomed, but
a natural aspiration of the state and certainly legal. The question arises whether
the United States do securitize their relationship with China in order to request
that their allies and partners show solidarity with the U.S. This also narrows the
choices of others. It is the reason why I am of the view that securitization
offers a shortcut that makes it possible to spare complex and eventually incon-
clusive arguments between the U.S. and EU/NATO Europe. It may be enough
to mention the United Kingdom. Americans acted strongly and very effectively
there. They took steps to prevent London from purchasing the 5G network
from China, and connected this by a possible restriction of “five eyes” intelli-
gence cooperation that exists between the five states (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, UK and the US). Eventually, the British, unlike several other
European states, gave in whereas a number of others kept relying on Chinese
5G technology although some upgraded the security (transparency) require-
ments. It would be premature to answer the question whether economic expan-
sion or intelligence is the real problem with Chinese 5G expansion. If anyone
may know what the real danger can be in this area, it may be the world’s leading
electronic intelligence power, the United States.
China is taking a path to avoid that the difference between democratic sta-
tes and Beijing’s own system would be two spectacular. It could be the reason
it knows itself that its system would not be attractive but to a few pseudo-dic-
tators. In particular, as far as the people are concerned that may be aware of
the autocratic nature of China that keeps gaining in centralization.
Consequently, China does not expect its partners to line up behind it. Partners
may have any kind of system ranging from democracy to full-fledged dictator-
ship, China relates neutrally to it. It is particularly careful to avoid commenting
on the political system of other states. This is especially welcomed by regimes
and leaders that are often criticized in the name of Western/democratic values.
However, there are precisely perceptible limitations that China’s friends/par-
tners better not cross. These include China’s political system, the human rights
situation and the issue of democracy, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China’s territo-
rial claims in the South China Sea.

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