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OSSERVATORIO INTERNAZIONALE

It is important to see that the recognition of the trap is thus delayed. It
remains to guesswork whether such uneven accords are made by corrupted lea-
ders or simply due to their inattention based on the false hope things never get
to the point that China can rely on its partner’s weakness. However, when one
speaks to locals in some affected countries it is widely assumed, it is the former
rather than the latter.
The political implications are fairly clear. There is no expectation to align
the dependent partner’s political system. China simply wants to silence any
international criticism at its address and expects some “minimal loyalty”. The
wider its influence gets, the less states will be in the position to criticize it and
the more the critical liberal center will be isolated in its critical assessment. This
is reflected first in universal and regional international organizations.
Furthermore, China reacts negatively to those smaller states that opt out of
silence and cause damage to them, including depriving them of some economic
benefits. Rather than focusing on the global south, it is suffice to mention states
from Australia, to the Czech Republic and Lithuania. For China this is mana-
geable as long as the “rebellion” is not concentrated and massive.
In this sense a divided West is just as in China’s interest as it is in Russia’s
although the foundations are not identical. The level of expectations towards
China’s “client states,” the different sequence of using various means and
methods just as the non-sovereignty constraining emphasis of Beijing make it
extremely difficult to resist China’s advancement by small and medium size
countries.
The meeting of the U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor
with the Chinese foreign minister and the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo
member for international affairs in Anchorage in March 2021 indicated the
coming of a rear-end collision although fortunately only at the negotiating
table. The United States points to that the challenge cannot be simplified to
economic rivalry:
1. Certain economic activities of China, including Huawei’s expansion
into the world market and the 5G network, illegal access to information and the
facilitation of access to Chinese loans and investments can be used to gain poli-
tical influence. All this in an ambitious framework, ‘the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI)’ and beyond.
2. China is aggressive in East and South-East Asia and the Pacific. To
some extent, both observations are well founded. The Secretary of State of the
Trump administration, Mike Pompeo in a speech summed up what the United
States expected from China: “We… must induce China to change”.

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