Page 19 - The CoESPU Magazine N 1 - 2018

How to Mobilize Civil Society in Support of Accountability for a Politicized/Criminalized Police Force
and Justice System?
· How can civil society be effectively mobilized?
· Is the engagement of civil society sufficient to make reform of the police and criminal justice system
locally led?
· How should the mission deal with a clash between the cultural norms of one or more of the parties to
the conflict and international norms regarding corruption/abuse of power for private gain and respect
for the human rights of the opposition?
· How can coordination among the international community and indigenous stakeholders be
accomplished when some are spoilers?
· What are the primary lessons to be learned from your experience?
The above agenda for research is addressed to both scholars and practitioners, but perhaps the center of
gravity for expertise on these issues is in Vicenza where the Center of Excellence for Stability Police
Units, the NATO Stability Police Center of Excellence, and the European Gendarmerie Force are located.
I pledge my unstinting support to any and all efforts that these organizations might wish to undertake to
pursue this agenda for research.

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i
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Guidelines: Police Capacity-
building and Development, April 1, 2015, 3. Available at https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sgf-
guidelines_police_cbd-2015.pdf
ii
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, December 2013,
32. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/2014-IAP-HandBook.pdf
iii
The 24 internal conflicts in which the UN has intervened since 1990 are listed below. The 17 underlined countries indicate
cases that either Steve Stedman’s research in “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” the cases examined in Criminalized
Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace and Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition, or the
findings of the Enough Project have determined that criminalized/illicit power structures (or “violent kleptocracies” in the
terminology used by the Enough Project) were spoilers: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia /Former Yugoslavia, Burundi,
Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan/Abyei,
Western Sahara. Further research would probably add others to this list (e.g., Burundi and Mali), but at a minimum 71% of the
post-Cold War conflicts in which the UN has intervened have confronted spoilers in the form of criminalized/illicit power
structures/violent kleptocracies.
iv
United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Policing,” S/2016/952, 5.
v
Annika S. Hansen, “Local Ownership in Peace Operations,” in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Timothy Donais
(ed.), (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 44.
vi
United Nations Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, “Handbook for Judicial Affairs
Officers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” June 2013, 28.
vii
United Nations Guidelines: Police Capacity-building and Development, April 1, 2015, 3

Written by:
Doct. Michael Dziedzic
Pax Advisor Consultant

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