Page 16 - The CoESPU Magazine N 1 - 2018
P. 16
The United Nations is a target for direct attack, including asymmetric threats, by some parties and
spoilers to peace processes. In certain contexts, this threat is further aggravated by the blurring of lines
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and collaboration between transnational criminal networks, extremist groups and political actors.
All of NATO’s peace and stability operations, which have been shared enterprises with the UN (i.e.,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq), have been
obstructed by spoilers in the
form of criminalized power
structures. Some have even
earned highly descriptive
brands (e.g., “parallel power
structures” in Bosnia and
“criminal patronage networks”
in Afghanistan).
Ones least likely to be
cooperative in a reform effort
because currently guidelines
and doctrine are oriented
toward building capacity so
ownership can be
expeditiously turned over to
prevailing authorities. When
the latter are also spoilers, however, the result is to dig the hole deeper. The current impasses faced by the
UN in South Sudan and the DRC are prominent contemporary cases in point. Annika Hansen, a former
Policy Officer in the DPKO Police Division provides this incisive explanation: “…those that are the most
v
dominant players are also the they have the most to lose.”
It would not be prudent to base future interventions on the best case assumption that the police forces and
legal systems that missions will be working with are part of the solution. Indeed, the empirical record
indicates the opposite has typically been the case. A more appropriate starting point would be to assess
not only capacity deficits but also whether the local police and judicial system are a politicized instrument
of repression and a source of impunity for criminalized elites and thus a potential or actual driver of
conflict. Another way to state this is that the first step must be to determine whether the police and
criminal justice system are part of the solution or part of the problem. If they are part of the problem (i.e.,
spoilers), how can the mission overcome this most vexing of stabilization challenges?
Extracting lessons from prior successful experiences with this conundrum is the agenda for research that I
propose. We need to develop lessons for dealing with police forces, legal systems, and governments that
are under the influence of spoilers, especially criminalized power structures. We should not assume that
capacity building alone will accomplish stabilization. To accomplish this research agenda, the following
lessons need to be learned:
· How to Properly Assess a Spoiler Threat and Devise a Strategy to Combat it Effectively
· How to Combat Impunity and Reform a Politicized/Criminalized Legal System
· How to Establish Accountability for the Police and Security Sector
· How to Mobilize Civil Society in Support of Accountability for a Politicized/Criminalized Police
Force and Justice System
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