Page 16 - The CoESPU Magazine N 1 - 2018
P. 16

The  United  Nations  is  a  target  for  direct  attack,  including  asymmetric  threats,  by  some  parties  and
          spoilers to peace processes. In certain contexts, this threat is further aggravated by the blurring of lines
                                                                                                       iv
          and collaboration between transnational criminal networks, extremist groups and political actors.
          All  of  NATO’s  peace  and  stability  operations,  which  have  been  shared  enterprises  with  the  UN  (i.e.,
                                                                                  Bosnia,  Kosovo,  Afghanistan,
                                                                                  and    Iraq),    have    been
                                                                                  obstructed  by  spoilers  in  the
                                                                                  form  of  criminalized  power
                                                                                  structures.  Some  have  even
                                                                                  earned    highly   descriptive
                                                                                  brands  (e.g.,  “parallel  power
                                                                                  structures”  in  Bosnia  and
                                                                                  “criminal patronage networks”
                                                                                  in Afghanistan).
                                                                                  Ones  least  likely  to  be
                                                                                  cooperative in a reform effort
                                                                                  because  currently  guidelines
                                                                                  and  doctrine  are  oriented
                                                                                  toward  building  capacity  so
                                                                                  ownership        can       be
                                                                                  expeditiously  turned  over  to
                                                                                  prevailing  authorities.  When
          the latter are also spoilers, however, the result is to dig the hole deeper. The current impasses faced by the
          UN in South Sudan and the DRC are prominent contemporary cases in point. Annika Hansen, a former
          Policy Officer in the DPKO Police Division provides this incisive explanation: “…those that are the most
                                                                 v
          dominant players are also the they have the most to lose.”
          It would not be prudent to base future interventions on the best case assumption that the police forces and
          legal systems that missions will be working with are part of the solution. Indeed, the empirical record
          indicates the opposite has typically been the case. A more appropriate starting point would be to assess
          not only capacity deficits but also whether the local police and judicial system are a politicized instrument
          of  repression  and  a  source  of  impunity  for  criminalized  elites  and  thus  a  potential  or  actual  driver  of
          conflict.  Another  way  to  state  this  is  that  the  first  step  must  be  to  determine  whether  the  police  and
          criminal justice system are part of the solution or part of the problem. If they are part of the problem (i.e.,
          spoilers), how can the mission overcome this most vexing of stabilization challenges?
          Extracting lessons from prior successful experiences with this conundrum is the agenda for research that I
          propose. We need to develop lessons for dealing with police forces, legal systems, and governments that
          are under the influence of spoilers, especially criminalized power structures. We should not assume that
          capacity building alone will accomplish stabilization. To accomplish this research agenda, the following
          lessons need to be learned:
          ·    How to Properly Assess a Spoiler Threat and Devise a Strategy to Combat it Effectively
          ·    How to Combat Impunity and Reform a Politicized/Criminalized Legal System
          ·    How to Establish Accountability for the Police and Security Sector
          ·    How to Mobilize Civil Society in Support of Accountability for a Politicized/Criminalized Police
               Force and Justice System






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