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UN STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
FOR EFFECTIVE ADVISING

not be controlled by the planners. dered in relation with the tour of the strategic adviser towards them:
While it is correct to use positive duty of the strategic adviser. And they should not be neglected.
experiences made elsewhere as a here lies another frequent mistake:
rough model for elaborating new their handover/takeover (HOTO) Main objective: Local Ownership
strategies, it is wrong to Copy&Pa- are too frequent, while strategies The importance of involving the
ste a solution forcing it upon the look far away embracing long pe- whole society is paramount in all
present situation without consi- riods of time. It is extremely diffi- capacity building processes. In
dering all standing differences. cult for advisers to step into stra- fact, any country passing through
Furthermore, the ultimate aim of tegies planned by someone else, difficulties so severe that they re-
the missions in which similar si- to understand them, implement quired the intervention of the inter-
tuations occurred could have been them, optimise them, reach all national community cannot afford
different, and that makes their re- set objective and then leave pas- to leave behind one or more com-
plication either useless or even sing the torch to their successors, ponents of their social fabric. Qui-
dangerous: all plans must be ai- all of that in the limited space of te often, when strategic advisers
med at reaching the given objecti- few months. The ensuing urge of arrive in theatre local hostilities are
ve. And objectives must be SMART accelerating procedures and for- not completely quenched yet. That
(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, cing ways out of hindering dea- makes their task even harder be-
Relevant and Time-bound). Non- dlocks to get positive results may cause, besides serious and urgent
SMART objectives
(read: fuzzy and
indeterminate,
hard to evaluate,
overly ambitious
and optimistic) is
another recurrent
problem in capa-
city building mis-
sions, including
their strategic
advising compo-
nent. Objectives
must be discussed
with local authorities, balancing jeopardise the mission, generate challenges due to the situation,
their requests – which in some ca- frustration and affect good coope- they also have to deal with perso-
ses can be excessively acquisitive ration with the local counterparts. nal and ideological prejudices their
– with actual resources and possi- The HOTO period itself need to local counterparts have against
bilities. Strategic advisers must be be long enough to allow a com- some segments of the community.
understanding but firm: someti- plete transfer of responsibilities, That requires immediate and deci-
mes no is the answer, and no must including personal introduction sive action: if the root causes of the
be said. Objectives must remain with the local representatives with past conflicts are not completely

SMART, and it is far better to even- whom the newcomer will work. eradicated peace will not last for
tually raise their aim once they And among local counterparts also long. Past frictions need to be left
have been reached than being for- non-state actors must be included. behind and a common strategy –
ced to give up after having gene- Even if some of them were not in- involving all social, political, ethnic,
rated false hope. Failure has heavy cluded in the processes that brou- tribal and religious groups – must
repercussions on the mission: mo- ght to the decision of launching be implemented through concur-
rale plummets, relationships dete- the mission, they are local rea- rent projects devised in coopera-
riorate, innocent scapegoats are lities to reckon with. They can be tion with the international com-
identified and credibility is gone. either obstacles or facilitators, and munity but, after the first phases,
Objectives must also be consi- much depends on the attitude of managed by the relevant national,

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