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covered in more detail later in this article.
               Many other researchers support the nexus and realize that its nature is defined by “the political
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               environment, available resources, and existing policies of State response.”   The nature may be
               a loose alliance between criminals and terrorists to support mutual objectives, terrorist groups
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               using criminal activity to support their goals, or disaffected criminals becoming terrorists.
               In  September  2018,  the  remains  of  87  elephants  were  found  near  a  protected  sanctuary  in
               Botswana.   Their tusks were missing and presumed to have been sold in the black market which
               is estimated to be worth $70-213 billion a year. Reports of the incident noted that such activity
               profits criminal organizations, rebel militias, and terrorist organizations. As the author observed,
               trafficking  of  “artifacts  and  natural  resources,  including  gold  and  other  precious  metals  and
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               stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal and oil” funds terrorism.
               Criminalized Power Structures (CPS)

               Strong patronage networks often control wealth and power in countries and regions that have UN
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               peacekeeping  mission.     As  Michael  Dziedzic  observed  in  his  book,  Criminalized Power
               Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, senior mission leadership tends to lump CPS in as
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               a corruption or organized crime problem that can be deferred in favor of more pressing issues.
               But, as he rightly concludes – this is shortsighted because such power brokers are a threat to the
               success of the mission and must be identified and dealt with.
               He further calls out the United Nations for ignoring these spoilers for political reasons.
               As he states:
                       “The recurrent trend is that missions arrive flat-footed, without the authorities,
                       resources, or inclination to control the spoiler threat to stabilization and peace
                       implementation posted by criminalized power structures. The “golden hour” is
                       squandered as a result. Unless those involved in peace implementation
                       recognized and understand how to address this complex threat, prospects for the
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                       emergency of sustainable peace and stable governance will be vitiated.”
               These power brokers make their wealth through ill-gotten means and some of those means are
               through  environmental  crime,  organized  crime,  terrorism,  and  corruption.    As  we  assess  the
               mission  environment,  we  must  take  a  page  from  Deep  Throat,  the  informant,  “follow  the
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               money.”
               As peacekeeping environments are assessed, mission leaders and planners must ask, “Where are
               the  fundamental  problems?”    If  the  corrupt  leaders  with  which  we  engage are using
               environmental crime to feather their nests, then it cannot be ignored.  Otherwise, we simply deal
               with the symptom and not the illness.


               Criminal Intelligence
               Though the negative impacts of environmental crime, and organized crime in general, are well-
               recognized  by  the  UN  and  other  international  actors,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  adequately
               addressed in current peacekeeping operations at the mission level. In fact, research demonstrates





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