Page 137 - Rassegna 2021-4
P. 137

SECURITY AND STATE BUILDING IN THE EXPERIENCE
                                 OF THE ITALIAN TRUST ADMINISTRATION IN SOMALIA




                  selection of 1/20 or 1/30 on the overall number of aspirants, and the contex-
                  tual possibility of gradually starting to purge the most irreducible elements
                  responsible for acts of disobedience or infidelity; a “Police School” was there-
                  fore reorganized in Mogadishu where not only the initial training courses were
                  concentrated, but also the supplementary ones for the older staff, whose pre-
                  paration had to be sustained and reviewed, and with the activation, from the
                  spring of ‘52, of the Preparatory School for the Admission to Italian Military

                  Schools, whose attendance was reserved for the most valid and promising ele-
                  ments who, later, could have attended further courses in Italy;
                        ➣ logistic, with the need to intervene in various fields; Gamble’s afore-
                  mentioned memo to Ferrara reported, relating to the supply of uniforms, the
                  necessity to make early arrangements for the supply of  Police uniforms. At present state of
                  kit is good but replacements - particularly K.D. items - should commence to be made available
                  within a month. No reserve stocks of  uniform have been handed over “ and Brunero confir-
                  med that “the Somalia Police Force was well dressed, very well, when the supplies were deli-
                  vered to us (...) but behind the facade there was nothing, absolutely nothing. The warehouses
                  were literally empty(…) It was therefore necessary to set up and immediately launch an orga-

                  nic plan for the equipment of  the Police force;
                        ➣ transportation, which required important interventions, as in the tran-
                  sfer agreements, made prior to the AFIS, the British had specified that they
                  would withdraw with all the vehicles of the armed forces but would leave those
                  of the Police; for this reason, while the Security Corps were immediately equip-
                  ped with new and suitable vehicles brought in tow from Italy, the Carabinieri
                  Group received only seven vehicles, counting on the inheritance that had be

                  found on the spot and that, instead , turned out to be a hodgepodge of 93 dif-
                  ferent vehicles in poor condition; therefore, thanks to the Internal Affairs
                  Office, 60 jeeps, 40 of which with long wheelbase, were purchased and, thanks
                  to Carabinieri Group Mechanic branch, the British vehicles that could be reco-
                  vered put back were put back into running conditions;
                        ➣ establishment planning/operations: with the establishment of a “mobi-
                  le border nucleus”, divided into three sub-nuclei, appointed to carry out over-
                  sight actions along the borders and to dissuade prosecuting periodic raids
                  which, as we have seen, gave rise to incidents between tribes and periodicals tre-
                  spassing of Ethiopian troops, and a fully motorized “rapid Police department”

                  for public order interventions in Mogadishu and its vast hinterland.
                        The public security situation was however worrying and required constant
                  interventions as well as accurate intelligence penetration: the recurring demon-
                  strations in urban centers were, in fact, part of the normal attributions of


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