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OSSERVATORIO INTERNAZIONALE

If the goal was to erect a Somali state over the Italian and, subsequently,
English colonies, one could not fail to clearly identify a territory within which
the sovereignty of the new political entity would have to be exercised. This
objective could not be pursued, having identified the borders dictated by the
status quo, if not by guarding and controlling them with the Police and secu-
rity forces on the one hand and, on the other, by developing respect for them

through the political action of government officials of across the border.
With regard to the clear definition of responsibilities for border surveillance,
during the handover phase between the British and the Italians, the English
admitted some confusion in the clear attribution of competences on the sub-
ject: in a memo for Gen. Ferrara from Brigadier General Gamble, he suggests
the use of the Somali Police only along the border with Ethiopia with the Ascari battalions
in reserve in Iscia Baidoa, Belet Uen and Rocca Littorio. This considering a relative con-
fusion regarding the responsibilities of the civil and military authorities towards the
Ethiopian border .
(29)
The authority the military urged the civil service, starting from 20 March

1950 with a direct letter to Secretary General Pompeo Gorini, to share direc-
tives on the matter. Ferrara , stating that military and Police elements would
(30)
overlap on the border line, proposed two solutions regarding the responsibi-
lity on the borders: the military one, with a hierarchy dependence on the
Police forces stationing in that area and functional dependence on the admi-
nistration for the normal institutional or a civil one, totally on the police, esta-
blishing appropriate links with the military authority. He deemed the first
choice as the most suitable solution, despite acknowledging the resistance of

the Administration which could have been overcome, at this point, only
through a vigilance entrusted to the Police, to be integrated, in case of parti-
cular needs, by the military component upon request of the political authori-
ties. Ferrara’s insistence on the exclusively military solution for border sur-
veillance was not illogical and finds a wide and detailed explanation in the
note attached to the letter to the Secretary General. The fears lay in the con-
fusion between “border”, with no clear definition, and “frontier”, conside-
ring that Ethiopian armed forces were aiming, in the region, at gaining terri-
tory to the detriment of Somalia, thus requiring a military intervention for
solving the problem.

(29) Promemoria del Gruppo CC Somalia, datato 29 marzo 1950, per il Gen. Ferrara, AUSSME,
f. I-2, Busta 43, fasc. 414.
(30) Lettera n. 1/1562 di prot. datata 20 marzo 1950 del CSS diretta all’AFIS - Segretario
Generale AUSSME, f. I-2, Busta 43, fasc. 414.

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