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STATE BUILDING E SICUREZZA NELL’ESPERIENZA
DELL’AMMINISTRAZIONE FIDUCIARIA ITALIANA IN SOMALIA

the initiative of the governor De Vecchi in the second half of the 1920s); the
need to recruit suitable personnel for specializations, so that the qualitative cri-
terion should prevail over the noble one; the low number of aspirants to enlist
between Arabs and Sab (which is understandable considering the inclination of
the Arabs, concentrated, above all, in the port centers, to trade, and to the Sab,
who inhabited the southern area of the country, to sedentary agriculture). In
fact, the initial opening of the various clans to recruitment possibilities differed
considerably.
In a memo dated 8 March 1950 (two months after the arrival of the initial
liaison mission and one month after the start of AFIS) , an officer reported
(25)
that, from the talks held with former Askari and Dubat, personally known as
former recruits in his past unit, the Darod people would have been against the
enlistment while the Hawiya were and, more particularly, among the Darods the
opposition would have been manifested only by the leaders, while the popula-
tion was indifferent. Therefore, the clear desire to create a military instrument
inspired by efficiency criteria emerges, where the representation of the diffe-
rent ethnic components was an important guiding criterion for guaranteeing a
public force that was both the expression of the Administration and of the
Somali State and not of any clan in particular.
General Alfredo Arnera of the Carabinieri who, in the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel was the last Commander of the Somali Police, made available, in
February 1979, his memories to Captain Nicola Raggetti for the drafting of his
thesis, had the same point of view. As for the composition of the Somali Police
force, he reported that “considering more closely the issue of a racial character,
we are faced with the other complex problem for AFIS: the particular social
structure of the Somali population (...). Grate efforts were profused to evolve
the traditional “Kabyle” mentality, intimately and deeply rooted in Somalis,
aimed at the construction of a modern and democratic State organization and
towards more advanced forms of associated life. (…) Even in the recruitment
of new agents, the HQ (first of the Military Units and then of the Police
Forces) always cared to keep the percentage of soldiers belonging to the two
main ethnic groups constantly balanced: Darot and Hauia. After the incorpo-
ration of the contingent of personnel from the Security Corps, this dosage pre-
sented a substantial imbalance in favor of the Hauia group” .
(26)

(25) Promemoria del Magg. Dante Guerra per il Capo Uff. Operazioni dell’8 marzo 1950, AUS-
SME, f. I-2, Busta 37, fasc. 397.
(26) Documenti elaborati dal sig. Gen. Arnera per la tesi di laurea del Cap. Raggetti, USCC,
Fondo AFIS, fasc. 871.16.

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