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I would first like to thank the
General Commander of the Carabinieri Officer Academy for
having invited me to this seminar, offering me the
opportunity of debating an issue of great interest in such a
numerous and qualified assembly. Of course it is not easy to
add to what has already been said by the honourable lecturers
who have just spoken before me, among whom commanders of
operational theatres who, having MSU departments at their
command, have been able to verify their efficiency on the
terrain. Therefore, all I can do is complete the picture,
though already very positive, drawn during the previous
briefings and setting forth some considerations deriving from
my personal experience as deputy commander of KFOR in 2001
and as top inter-force operational Commander, position I have
been covering for the last two years. As already mentioned
there is no doubt that the Carabinieri, because of their
bivalent juridical status and their particular institutional
tasks, have absolutely peculiar and in some way exclusive
characteristics that make them a prestigious component of the
military tool. Such peculiarities and characteristics, which
may be summed into the two souls, military and police, have
been harmoniously merged into MSU formations, which managed
to distinguish themselves as highly appreciated tools at
international level for their importance and flexibility in
peace support operations (PSO) or crises reconstruction
operations (CRO) especially as the linking element between
true and proper military operations and activities in support
of local communities and reconstruction of the civilian
tissue in crisis areas.
The governing
structure of the MSU regiments itself, based on the operational and
manoeuvring component, may be employed in a vast and multifarious
range of tasks from the typical ones of public order and security
to those of terrorism and criminality, as well as those regarding
the assistance to local police forces. All this in an environment
marked by high indexes of instability and risk and within complex
military operations, almost always carried out in inter-force and
multinational contexts. In particular, the extraordinary
professionalism and the age-old experience matured by the
Carabinieri in the field of public order make them, in the hands of
the commander, a precious component capable of facing situations of
unrest due to riots among the population or mass demonstrations,
often violent, which are all but rare in areas of crisis. In these
cases, experience has proved that the intervention, sometimes even
the presence alone, of the MSU units, far more than the massive
deployment of military divisions, contributes to defuse without
bloodshed potentially explosive situations of tension. Moreover,
the investigative activity in the field of criminality and
terrorist organisations is deeply rooted in the very structure of
the Carabinieri who, in carrying out the specific mission employ
highest quality human resources and materials and a specific
info-investigative system closely linked to similar national and
international organisations. This is an extraordinarily important
activity, which transferred to the operational theatre represents a
determining contribution to the security and stability of the
crisis area.
Another field
where MSU divisions can give excellent results is in giving support
to local police by means of a triad of training, monitoring and
mentoring interventions designed to train and equip newly recruited
agents and sustain them during operations, helping them to become
credible and reliable in the eyes of the people as future
protagonists of social and civil growth of one's country. 78 It is
not surprising that the creation and the use of multinational
specialized units by Italy was greeted with enthusiasm at
international level and that the commanders of the operational
theatres consider this unit as a precious support to their command,
apt to cover the extremely delicate and sometimes undefined "grey
area" linking classic operational activities and support and
control initiatives of civil and social order, which are
integrating part of any peace support mission.
It is wise,
however, to underline the fact that the insertion and use of MSU
units within inter-force and multinational contingents is not
devoid of difficulties and requires the adoption of tactics and
provisions made necessary by the specificity and the
characteristics of the different components at stake. I refer to
those provisions suggested by the multi-annual experience of
"outside" missions, which must be carefully considered by military
planners and commanders to avoid a wrong and improper use of such
precious resources. Firstly, military commanders in charge of the
operational control must guarantee the knowledge of the capacities,
potentialities and limits of these bodies, This must not be taken
for granted since in general the "operational surveyor" is an
officer of another armed force and does not always have the
knowledge and experience necessary to rule MSU units at best.
Conversely, Carabinieri officers who take the leadership of an MSU
must be perfectly aware of missions and tasks, as well as of
employment criteria and tactic procedures of the national and
foreign units they have to work with. The need for this reciprocal
understanding must be satisfied, obviously, by exchanging
information, joint training and the organisation of joint and
combined exercises and initiatives such as this seminar may be very
useful to this aim. Moreover, it is of the utmost importance to
guarantee interoperability, if not integration, of communication
and command and control systems of the MSU units with those of
superior and collateral military commands and of local and
international police forces in the area, bearing in mind that the
Carabinieri's info-investigative system must also be able to
interact in a mutual exchange with the architecture of the
operational intelligence created by the military commands in the
theatre since criminality, terrorist armed groups and regular enemy
formations are part of a single aspect of the security and
stability threat in the crisis area.
It is therefore
a matter of creating a single integrated system under the theatre
operational commander where land task forces and MSU act in close
coordination. Special attention must be given to the definition of
the MSU division task organisation, which must be carefully
balanced on the basis of the mission to be carried out, the
typology of the operational theatre, the progress of the crisis
area stabilisation process. Thus not a rigid structure, but
flexible and ready to adapt, during the mission if necessary, to
the development of the situation on the terrain by a clever dosage
of the operational and manoeuvre components and of the single
constitutive cells. Lastly, a structure apt to receive, both as
regards command staff and employment divisions, personnel of other
allied countries and friends to fully take on a multinational
aspect. In conclusion, let us consider the command and control
organisation. To carry out its function in the best possible
manner, the MSU unit must have enough freedom of action and
manoeuvre to allow it to spread the presence of its "sensors" as
far as possible over the territory, widen its intelligence and
investigative network, even beyond the limits of the sector under
its responsibility and keep constantly in touch with local
populations and institutions.
Due to its high
specialisation, which makes it a limited and precious resource, it
operates directly under a multinational or national interforce
commander who is in charge of a well-defined area of
responsibility. It is not rare, however, that for particular
missions and on explicit national delegation, it may be employed,
as a whole or in part, at a higher level as well. A debate was
opened recently within Nato and the European Union regarding the
opportunity of placing MSU units under the direction of civilian
authorities representing the international community in the region
concerned by the crisis. I have no intention to deepen the issue,
but I would like to underline the fact that such a hypothesis would
mean the use, foreseen by the European Union within the IPU
(Integrated Police Units), in situations of advanced stabilisation
of the crisis area where a military presence plays a role of mere
deterrence and the Carabinieri units are part of the assets of the
multinational police established with this in mind. In this case
however, I do not believe we can continue to talk of MSU, at least
as it is understood by military planners.
I will close
this brief intervention, aware of having just skimmed over
important aspects regarding the use of MSU units, which represent a
true added value integrating and enhancing the capacities of the
Italian armed forces in their intense and burdensome task in the
most multifarious and critical operational theatres in favour of
peace, stability and international security.
(*) - Lieutenant General,
Commander of the Joint-Forces Top Operational
Command. |
