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Fifteen years have passed since the
end of the two-bloc era and the change in the nature of
conflicts, though considered as a protean event, should
represent a metabolized event, or at least one being
metabolized by those in charge of nation building and
military interventions in crisis areas. Apart from the
disquisition over the asymmetry of conflicts, whether
potential or already existing, we may focus our attention on
the issue of the intervention of forces responsible for
territory control and thus for the immediate stabilization of
the nation building process. We are in the face of a delicate
stage where the peculiar characteristic of non-traditional
conflicts of the postindustrial era are clearly
manifest.
Conflicts where
civilians are personally involved. The "irregular" typology of
opposing forces on the territory requires a less conventional
approach to the problem of stabilization considered in all its
aspects. The history of conflicts tells us that very often the
combat component of armies directs the effort towards the center of
gravity of potential military and political enemies. In Iraq
Anglo-American troops carried out a rather brief land campaign, and
launched themselves in the conquest of Baghdad, the capital. The
chronicles of those days testify to attacks to allied logistic
columns by prevailingly non-conventional forces formed by Baathist
militias and firing groups organized by Saddam's intelligence. In
these cases, during a war, the rear lines have to be controlled in
a pervasive manner in order to eliminate the source of the problem,
guerrilla warfare. The reduction of the maneuver space of the
guerrilla and, therefore, of instability at theatre level, is an
objective that may be reached by a rapid return to normal security
and liability of the areas concerned by the phenomenon.
However, the
distraction of entire combat units from the front line to increase
the security of communication thoroughfares and the logistic flow
of rear lines, reduces the pressure exercised against the enemy,
thus lengthening the conflict. Demands however are incompatible.
Modern wars fought by Western countries cannot disregard the time
factor. The latter heavily affects the consent of public opinion to
the use of the military tool and conditions military operations
carried out on the terrain. A prolonged war effort, excessive
collateral damage and, chiefly, considerable and continuous loss of
soldiers lead to loss of the population's favour towards the
pursuance of the political aims established by the force. The
transition from war to nation building is thus a priority. This may
start during the central stages of the conflict by the pacification
of the military controlled areas. However, at this point, on the
basis of the lessons learned from " Iraqi Freedom" the approach to
the problem must be re-examined.
Nowadays it
seems obvious to everyone that land forces must be structured on
the basis of a combat component specifically envisaged to stabilize
and reconstruct. Nation building becomes an integrating part of the
operation planning in its entirety and not a separate chapter to be
sized only at the end of the conflict. From the Italian viewpoint
it must be mentioned that, in leaving the true and proper combat
role to the army, it is necessary that other components of the
Defense have new professional skills favouring nation building and
maintaining a close adherence to the combat component. 160 At
present this is an unfailing necessity. It goes without saying that
the fluidity of war dynamics does not allow the flow in the theatre
and the full operativeness of NGOs. There is still need of soldiers
capable of defending themselves and the civil population, but they
will have to stand in the shoes of public administrators and
suppliers of first necessity services, contributing in difficult
environmental contexts to the recovery of a normal daily life.
Levels of
general security and stabilization are closely connected factors.
The improvement of the civil population's life quality almost
always corresponds to a reduction of maneuver space of enemy forces
(that is guerrilla warfare or terrorism). We previously mentioned
the need for the employment of soldiers, but, in the shortest
possible time, of police agents as well (similar to those in the
MSUs), mainly to train local corps designed to maintain public
security and order. Thus the MSUs represent the security component
of "stabilization packages" articulated into services, justice and
communications. As often proved in the Balkans (in Bosnia
Herzegovina and in Kosovo) the MSU, formed by the Italian
Carabinieri and other military police components, is fully capable
of carrying out security and investigative police functions by
employing in the theatre elements characterized by a remarkable
professionalism. The easiness with which the Carabinieri face the
social tissue of the regions where they perform their institutional
activity is under everybody's eyes.
The excellent
relations with the local population and the operational results
reached are proof of the intense security production enjoyed by the
population itself as well as by the SFOR and KFOR peace
contingents. Though maintaining the stabilization packages under
the land commandeer from the personnel viewpoint, the MSUs should
implement their role by articulating it into the plurality of the
new tasks. This however will impose deep changes as regards the
training of those elements destined for the stabilization function.
A training center could be established where to develop a doctrinal
line to be applied during CRO/PSO missions, to avoid drawing Corps
personnel from the Territorial Organization, with all that this
ensues as regards different methods in carrying out services. The
results of experiences matured in the theatre are an important
ground on which to build a profitable capitalization. It is now a
matter of devoting resources to the project while maintaining a
constant dialogue with the other Armed Forces, aware that at
present the Country cannot afford, nor would it understand, useless
and expensive duplications.
(*) - Head of the Institute for
Geopolitical Studies. |
