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1. Premise
The persistence of international
terrorism is dramatically demonstrated by the doleful events of 11
September 2001, whose damaging consequences are without precedent,
even though their dynamics - as evidenced by an attentive
historical-analytical examination - reflect the adoption,
adaptation, and harmonization of techniques either time-tested or
already conceived but failed or frustrated.
By definition, international terror-
ism involves citizens or territory of two or more countries. While
the forces that drive this phenomenon are multiple, two patterns
tower over the rest in the contemporary world. The first is
represented by the so-called combatant Communist parties, today
considerably weakened. The second is represented by Islamic
radicalism, today in full vigor.
With respect to other driving forces, whose international
manifestations are actually more akin to spasms than patterns, the
greater incidence of the two patterns under consideration is
ostensibly due to their capacity to attract and aggregate human
resources, express ideals, aspirations, and resentments, and
exploit contingent societal factors.
Considering and comparing these two patterns is useful in order to
examine the scope of international terrorism not merely as an
occasional phenomenon of a tactical nature, but as a systematic one
having strategic designs. From this comparison it is possible,
moreover, to draw useful indications regarding the danger posed by
international terrorism as a political manifestation, on one hand,
and as a politico-religious manifestation, on the other.
2.Combatant Communist Partiesn
LThe combatant Communist parties,
highly dynamic in the 1970s and 1980s and in decline since the
1990s, draw their inspiration from Marxism-Lenin-ism
contemporaneously conceived as an all-encompassing ideology and an
instrument in the struggle against Fascism, at the domestic level,
and imperialism, at the international level. Terrorist groups such
as the Brigate Rosse (BR) in Italy, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)
in Germany, Action Directe (AD) in France, the Cellules Communistes
Combattantes (CCC) in Belgium, and the Grupo de Resistencia
Antifascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain, resorted to the
armed struggle while interacting at the same time with the broader
subversive Movement, which, in turn, included such aggregations as
Autonomia, Guerrilla Difusa, and Gauche Prolétarienne, to cite the
most prominent ones, and conducted agitation tactics as a
pre-revolutionary step. The shared and stated objective of the
Movement and of the combatant Communist parties is the effacement
of the alleged injustices inbred in bourgeois society.
At both levels - subversive agitation and terrorism - these
aggregations operate predominantly in an autonomous manner within
individual states, while they are fully convinced to be an integral
part of proletarian internationalism without frontiers. The groups
that fall within this milieu, which embraces the Movement as well
as the combatant Communist parties, are multiple and many of them
appear and disappear from the scene or become absorbed, thanks to
operational or even occasional contacts, by organizations or
formations more stably entrenched.
Although, in general, the dynamics of these groups entail domestic
subversive and terrorist actions, internationalism is a significant
component of their rhetoric and mindset. While the Movement and the
combatant Communist parties arise in reaction to the alleged
conversion of the orthodox Communist parties to social democracy,
equally firm is their faith in the principles that inspired in the
past the Comintern, the Cominform, and the International Department
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. This spirit of belonging to the working class and commitment
to the internationalist struggle has produced meetings, liaison,
forms of mutual support, planning, and, less frequently, joint
actions.
Elements of the Movement have repeatedly met in Europe and Latin
America to strengthen their ideological ties, sometimes with the
participation of North American representatives. Liaison structures
among kindred groups at the intercontinental level arose in various
European countries. At the same time multi-national organisms for
training, technical support and other services stand out, including
Brigada Europea Jose Martì, Aide et Amitié, Junta de Coordinación
Revolucionaria, Hyperion, and International Red Aid.
The combatant Communist parties have repeatedly called for the
construction of the Combatant Anti-Imperialist Front at the
international level. To that end, there are numerous cases of
logistical cooperation, for example, between the BR and RAF and
between AD and CCC. From a joint operational stand- point, a series
of Euroterrorist attacks took place in Germany, France, the Benelux
countries, and the Iberian Peninsula in the 1980s. The nature of
the targets, the time frame, the modus operandi, and the wording of
the concomitant responsibility claims lead to the conclusion that
these attacks were part of a coordinated plan subsequently executed
individually by the RAF, AD, CCC, and GRAPO. Further terrorist
attacks - including the ones signed jointly by RAF-AD and RAF-BR
and others claimed by combat units bearing the name of comrades of
different nationalities fallen for the common cause - substantially
reflect ideological solidarity.
Elements belonging to the RAF or similar German groups have also
conducted joint operations with Palestinian organizations,
particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) created in 1967 to give an anti-imperialist dimension to the
Palestinian question in Marxist-Leninist terms. This particular
milieu included the notorious Venezuelan revolutionary Carlos, who
managed a European network embracing Middle Eastern an European
militants. Among their joint operations, it is worth recalling the
seizure of the OPEC ministers in Vienna, the hijackings terminated
in Entebbe and Mogadishu, and the attack on Maison de France in
West Berlin. Moreover, the Japanese Red Army committed terrorist
actions in the interest of the Palestinian cause in both the Middle
East and Europe, while the BR joined the Lebanese Armed
Rev-olutionary Faction in the responsibility claim for the attack
on the director general of the Multinational Force and
Observers.
In addition, one should not overlook the relations entertained by
the combatant Communist parties with members of the now defunct
Warsaw Pact and with Middle Eastern powers. For example, the
historical record reflects asylum and other forms of support
granted by Czechoslovakia to the BR and by East Germany to the RAF,
as well as the recurring presence of the Carlos apparat in those
two countries and in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Syria, Libya, and
Sudan. Lebanon, subject to Syrian military presence, has likewise
been a training area and a locale for lateral contacts among
certain combatant Communist parties and Third World national
liberation movements.
3. Radical Islamic
Organizations
CAs a movement for the establishment
of Muslim governance, Islamic rad-icalism was born in the 1920s
with the creation of an organization of Egyptian origin known as
the Muslim Brother-
hood. From the outset, Islamic radical-
ism opposed not only colonialism, but also Western modernism and
non-Islamic Arab governments. The radicalization process
intensified with the formation of the State of Israel and the
movement itself gradually internationalized, facilitated by the
emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and the Gulf War, to the point of reaching its current
dynamism.
Individually considered, the aggregations of greater relevance
today are Hizballah or Party of God, Shia, Egyptian, and
pro-Iranian, operational since the 1980s; Hamas or Islamic
Resistance Movement and Palestine Islamic Jihad, both Sunni,
operating in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank since the late 1980s
the former and since the late 1970s the latter; the Armed Islamic
Group (GIA), Sunni and Algerian, in existence since the early
1990s, and it spin-off, Salafi Group for Call and Combat; al-Jihad
or Holy War and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya or Islamic Group, both Sunni
and Egyptian, formed in the late 1970s; the Abu Sayyaf Group, Sunni
and southern Filipino, a spin-off of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front since 1991; Harakat ul-Mujahidin or Movement of Islamic
Fighters, Jaish-e-Mohammed or Army of Mohamed, and Lashkar-e-Tayyba
or Army of the Righteous, all three Sunni, Pakistani and active
primarily in the Kashmir area claimed by both Pakistan and India;
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a coalition of Islamic
militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states.
Besides aiming at the creation of an Islamic theocratic government
in their own country or even in their geopolitical area, all of the
above-listed aggregations share one or more of the following
char-acteristics: a dual structure, overt, on the one hand, for
political action, religious ministry, proselytizing, fundraising,
and social assistance, and covert, on the other hand, for terrorist
initiatives; hatred for Israel; the presence of representative
organs abroad; terrorist action beyond their own national
boundaries; and holy war without quarter against the infidel at the
universal level.
Some of these groups have enjoyed or still enjoy to this day forms
of support from sponsor states governed by either theocratic or
secular regimes. Iran has been supporting Hizballah, Hamas, and
Palestine Islamic Jihad and is accused by Egypt of supporting also
Holy War and the Islamic Group. According to press sources, Libya
has paid ransom to the Abu Sayyaf Group, thus encouraging it to
commit further abductions of West-ern citizens. Sudan has granted
asylum to Holy War, the Islamic Group, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic
Jihad, which exploit-ed it as an operational base. Moreover,
Algeria has charged Sudan with support-ing the GIA. Syria has been
assisting on its own territory Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad
and allows them, as well as Hizballah, to use the Bekaa Valley in
Lebanese territory. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan avails
itself of the Iranian radio system to broadcast propaganda. India
accuses Pakistan of assisting Islamic terrorist organizations that
operate in Kashmir(1).
Other forms of assistance, primarily financial, issue from private
benefactors aware or unaware of supporting domestic and
international terrorism, given the dual structure utilized by
several of these groups, which, thanks precisely to their dual
structure, respond to a socio-economic void unfilled by government
or society in many Third World countries. This aspect increases
popular following and the relative danger posed by Islamic
radicalism.
The most radical Islamic activists, in order to wage holy war
against the infidel, have given birth to an internation-al network,
not to be confused with the mild concept of ummah that unites the
Muslim faithful in the conviction of belonging all to one nation,
that is, the nation of Islam. The internationalization of Islamic
radicalism draws its origins from the Afghani resistance against
the Soviet Union, followed by a further resistance conceived as a
struggle against the American and Western occupation of the holiest
places of Islam and against West-ern polluting of the Islamic
world, nefariously allowed by local regimes viewed as
corrupt.
In this context, a series of well known events has taken place: the
constitution in the late 1980s of al-Qaida, or The Base, as an
umbrella for coordinating, training and supporting various
subordinate, semi-autonomous, and autonomous organizations
dedicated to holy war at the global level(2); the training in
Afghanistan of approximately 11,000 militants, who subsequently
either fought in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Dagestan or returned
to their respective countries to conduct an internal struggle or
took up residence in the West to set up operational and logistical
cells; the issuance of numerous anti-Western fat-was or religious
decrees, among which stands out the one of February 1998
undersigned by representatives of al-Qaida, Holy War (Egypt),
Islamic Group (Egypt), Jamat-ul-Ulema (Pakistan), and Jihad
Movement (Bangladesh), in which all Muslims are called upon to kill
Americans and their allies, civilians as well as military, wherever
possible; the creation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against
Jews and Crusaders; the fine tuning, until the recent Western
military intervention in Afghanistan, of a triad consisting of
Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan;
and about twenty anti-Western terrorist attacks that culminated in
the destruction of the Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon.
The purposes and the objectives of Islamic radicalism are clearly
defined in a document found in England in May 2000 and titled
Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, which states in
part: The main mission … is the overthrow of the godless regimes
and their replacement with an Islamic regime. Other missions
consist of the following:
1. Gathering information about the enemy (...);
2. Seizing enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms;
3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists;
4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy;
5. Spreading rumors and writing state-ments that instigate people
against the enemy;
6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and
sin;
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital
economic centers;
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the
cities(3).
4. Final Considerations
ABoth the combatant Communist
parties and Islamic radicalism allege to stand for values:
political and secular ones in the first case and political and
religious ones in the second. In both cases, dedication to the
pursuit of their respective values is absolute, while
in-significant are the rights of those who do not share those
values. Further mutual characteristics include exploitation of
societal conditions; support drawn from individual citizens,
private organizations, and state sponsors; various forms of
propa-ganda and proselytizing; and internationalist aims and
structures.
At the same time, Islamic radical-ism, in so far as motivated by a
combination of religiously-based idealism and fanaticism, possesses
a greater capacity than the combatant Communist parties to produce
symbols and to attract followers. It suffices to recall that the
figure of Osama bin Laden, however inflated by his admirers and
detractors, greatly out-distances such personalities as Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli, Carlos, and Abu Nidal. Moreover, within the logic of
total war, Islamic radicalism is decidedly more indis-criminate in
its targeting, as evidenced on 11 September 2001, and therefore
endea-vors not only to change the legal and social order, but also
to destroy whom-ever belongs to a different socio-political culture
without even being an official or substantive flag bearer
thereof.
(1)
For additional details on state sponsorship, which is challenged by
the interested parties, see U.S. Department of State, Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2000, Washington, D.C., April 2001 and previous
annual editions.
(2) Immediately prior to Western intervention in Afghanistan,
al-Qaida reportedly included an advisory council, four committees
(respectively concerned with military affairs, religious affairs,
finance, and media), 5500 armed men, and cells in at least 50
countries. See Il Foglio, 13 September 2001, p.1.
(3) Text drawn from International Herald Tribune, 29 October 2001,
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